The Automobile Insurance Industry
and Federal Takeover
Jeffrey O'Connell-

It is part of the badge of being a red-blooded American businessman
to oppose government regulation of business and-as the ultimate
anathema-to oppose government takeover, i.e., government operation
of an enterprise that might otherwise be run by private business.
Although the insurance industry has long been regulated on the
state level, there seems little or no fear of takeover by state government.
But nowhere does one find fear of takeover by the federal government
any stronger than in the insurance industry. Nor is this fear totally
groundless. Insurance-tied inextricably to misfortune and the welfare
of those who suffer from it-is obviously fraught with public interest.
That interest is the reason for the intense regulation (in theory at
least) of insurance in the first place. Clearly government is concerned
with what succor is available to victims of accidents and catastrophe
and their survivors. Clearly, too, government provides aid to unfortunates from public coffers, often thereby competing, more or less, with
private insurance. Social security, payable to survivors of decedents, to
the permanently disabled, to the retired, and to the aged for medical
care, is the classic example of such government aid. And in the case of
social security, the aid is somewhat analogous to insurance since the
recipient contributes to the system, thus, in a measure, paying "premiums" for the payout he eventually receives. This makes the competition with private insurance all the more obvious.
The scope of social security has expanded through the years with

coverage for new categories and provision for higher payments. Many
an insurance executive anxiously looks over his shoulder to see to what
extent government insurance is catching up with him. In fact, however,
the growth of social security and other forms of social insurance has
been very modest in the United States compared to other industrialized
countries. Nevertheless, the insurance executive still feels the threat
of government takeover looming large.
To examine the depths of this fear-and how realistic it is-we might
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turn to the current controversy over reform of automobile insurance.
It is true that there have recently been several proposals for turning
over at least a part of automobile insurance to federal insurance, i.e.,
insurance written and administered by the federal government.1 In at
least one instance, the seriousness of these proposals has been exaggerated. It is often pointed out that Daniel P. Moynihan, former Director
of the Joint Center for Urban Studies at Harvard-M.I.T. and currently
Executive Secretary of President Nixon's Council for Urban Affairs,
has advocated a system of federal insurance for traffic accidents. 2 In
fact, a close reading of Moynihan's article reveals that his proposal for
federal insurance was actually a less favored alternative to a system of
private automobile insurance, payable, unlike the present tort system,
without regard to who is at fault in the accident. Speaking of such nonfault insurance to be administered by private insurance companies
whereby an insurance company will pay its own insured regardless of
fault, Moynihan stated:
This is exactly what happens, for example, with fire insurance.
Householders buy their own insurance. If their house catches
fire, regardless of who is responsible (barring fraud), their company compensates them. The settlement process involves a
relationship between a business firm and one of its clients.
Thus, the many hundreds of thousands of fire insurance claims
are settled each year with nothing like the turmoil accompanying automobile claims.
It is hard to fault the Basic Protection scheme3 [for auto1 See, e.g., W. BLUm & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAw PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM-AuTo COMPENSATION PLANs (1965); Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in

the Automobile Injury Impasse, 52 A.B.A.J. 533, 534 (1966); Conard, The Economic
Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REv. 279 (1964).
2 Moynihan, Next: A New Auto Insurance Policy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1967, § 6
(Magazine), at 26, 80-82.
3 The Basic Protection Automobile Insurance Plan is set forth most fully, along with
documentation for its pressing need and a draft statute, in R. KEETON &- J. O'CONNELL,
BASIC

PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTuM:

A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE

(1965) [hereinafter cited as BASIC PROTECTION]. For a slightly revised and updated version of chapter 6 of this book, see Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 400, 408-39, in CRaIsIs IN CAR INSURANCE 40, 48-79
(R. Keeton, J. O'Connell & J. McCord, eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as CRIsIs]. See also
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRAssI--THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND INSURANCE
RErmOs
(1967) (a version written for the general reader).
The Basic Protection Plan has two main features: (1) a new form of compulsory automobile insurance (called Basic Protection Coverage) will compensate all those injured
in traffic accidents without reference to anyone's fault or lack of it. Basic Protection
Insurance will pay up to limits of $I0,000 per victim for any victim's out-of-pocket
losses--consisting principally of medical expenses and wage losses. Payment would not
be made under Basic Protection for pain and suffering. Whenever a motorist carrying
Basic Protection Plan insurance is involved in an accident, his own Basic Protection
INsURANCE
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mobile insurance payable by one's own insurance company
regardless of fault]. The authors [of the Basic Protection Plan]
are right

. . .

in the all-important perception as to what it is

Americans are good at. We are good at maintaining business
relationships once a basis for mutual self-interest is established.
4
The Basic Protection Plan would establish one.
The trouble is that many insurance executives view such a proposal
of nonfault insurance whereby a company pays its own insured regardless of who is to blame for the accident as inevitably leading to federal
insurance. Proposals for nonfault auto insurance have been made since
the early 1980's 5 and until very recently the almost unanimous response of the insurance industry was to dismiss such plans, often
labeling them as "socialistic." 6
At first blush it is a little hard to understand why such plans should
be labeled as socialistic. The term "socialism," after all, connotes
governmental ownership of the means of production and control of
the distribution of goods.7 But almost all the plans proposed for nonfault automobile insurance have explicitly preserved private insurance
as the means of administering the system.8 Even if the definition of
"socialism" be stretched to include increased governmental regulation
of business, the reform proposals usually do not change the basic pattern
of insurance regulation from that operating today.
In one sense, however, it may be understandable that nonfault inInsurance Company will compensate him; (2) the second feature of the plan is a law
that partially exempts from liability for negligent driving all those insured under Basic
Protection (which will include virtually all motorists, since Basic Protection Insurance
will be a prerequisite to registration of an automobile). In those tort cases in which
damages for pain and suffering do not exceed $5,000, and other damages, such as those
for medical expenses and wage loss, do not exceed $10,000, liability for negligence
would be eliminated. In all other cases, the exemption would reduce the liability for
negligence by the same amount.
4 Moynihan, supra note 1, at 82.
5 See COMMITTEE

TO STUDY

COMPENSATION

FOR AUTOMOBILE

ACCIDENTs,

REPORT

TO

SCIENCES (1932). For
other proposals for nonfault automobile insurance see A. EHRENzWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIc VIarmt-A VOLUNTARY COMPENSATION PLAN (1954), reprinted
under the same title in a slightly revised form in 43 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1955); L. GREEN,
TRAFFIC VIcrIMs--ToRT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact
of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962). For a discussion of these and
other proposals of reform, see BASIC PROTECTION 124-89.
6 See, e.g., remarks of W.J. Jeffery, Chairman and President of the United States
Fidelity and Guarantee Company, The National Underwriter (Fire & Casualty), Oct. 13,
1967, at 2, col. 1; see also The Workshop Sessions: Summary Report, 1967 U. ILL. L.F.
618, 630-1, in CRIsis 258, 270-1.
7 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcrnoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2162
(unabr. 1961).
8 See BASIC PROTECTION, app. B, Item No. 10, at 532-3.
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surance should be labeled "socialistic." The development of liability
based on fault coincided with the industrial revolution. Nor was this
joint development by chance, according to Fowler Harper and Fleming
James. "It was but another manifestation of the individualism which
underlies laissez faire as a political philosophy." Industrial activity
was not to be burdened with the inevitable toll it exacts in human life
and limb unless the activity had not been carried out with due care.
Also, there was to be no imposition of liability unless the defendant
had been "guilty of some personal moral shortcoming,"' 0 and there
was to be no leveling by lumping the careful and careless together.
Given the earlier identity of the fault concept with the heyday of
laissez faire capitalism, perhaps it is not surprising that the converse
identification of the opposite of payment based on fault-namely payment based on other than fault-should be identified with the opposite
of laissez faire capitalism-namely socialism. But, in fact, the equation
of payment without reference to fault with socialism is specious. Insurance payable without reference to who is at fault is perfectly consistent with private enterprise as generations of private insurance
coverage of workmen's compensation have demonstrated.
But if the historical argument falls, insurers have another reason
they advance for identifying payment of insurance without reference
to fault with government insurance. According to James Kemper, Jr.,
President of the Kemper Insurance Companies,
the surest road to federal regulation and federal automobile
insurance is the Basic Protection plan.
[T]he Basic Protection plan, a compulsory accident in[..
surance system which . . . largely eliminates the need for
determining fault, is primarily a system for dispensing benefits, and therefore a natural precursor to a complete takeover
of this segment of the private sector by the federal government.
[I]t is a matter of cause and effect: Basic Protection
leading irresistably to federal insurance."
But why should making insurance compulsory and payable without
reference to fault lead "irresistably" to federal insurance? It certainly
has not done so in the case of workmen's compensation. Certainly the
wide variety of other forms of nonfault insurance-such as accident
and health coverage and fire insurance-have not led "irresistably" to
9 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, Tni

LAw oF TORTS § 12.3, at 752 (1956).
10 Id.
11 Kemper, The Basic Protection Plan: Reform or Regression?, 1967 U. ILL. L.F.
459, 469, in Cmis 99, 109.
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their being taken over by the federal government. In other words, the
mere fact that a system of insurance is "primarily a system for dispensing benefits" does not make such a system "a natural precursor
to a complete takeover of [that] ... segment of the private sector by
12

the federal government."'
Nevertheless, some insurance executives continue to equate simplifying auto insurance with a federal takeover. One version of the argument-as I have pieced it together in conversation with different
insurance personnel-seems to run something like this: The simplei
and easier the manner of payment, the more readily the government
can step in and take it over, absorbing the coverage in its ever-expanding social security program. On the other hand, the more the criterion
for payment is complicated, the more argument there is likely to be over
what, if anything, is to be paid, which in turn undermines the government's confidence in its ability to administer the program. In other
words, the government has little taste for insurance which is going
to lead to constant battles over who and what is to be paid. Thus, the
more the flavor of the complicated tort system can be preserved, the
less likely government takeover of that form of insurance.
Does this explain, at least in part, the formula of the Guaranteed
Benefits Plan, principally sponsored by the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, wherein the victim of an auto accident is given a rather
complicated option, in dealing with the other driver's insurance company, of taking nonfault benefits for his out-of-pocket loss and waiving
18
his tort claim or, on the other hand, pursuing his tort claim?
12 Id. Mr. Kemper also argues that confusion about how to set rates for new nonfault
auto insurance without the benefit of prior loss experience will so overburden state
regulators that it "will increase the pressure for federal regulation of the insurance industry." Id. In turn, the federal government will be as unable to rate this new insurance
as state governments and at this point federal insurance will be "irresistable," among
other things, to dear up the interstate chaos caused by differing versions of nonfault
insurance having been passed in some states along with a tort system being retained
in others. Id.
But in answer to this, are we really so locked into the present system that if we
want to preserve private enterprise for the insurance industry, along with state regulation, we cannot institute significant reform, so appalling are the problems of rating new
forms of insurance? Were the problems of rating workmen's compensation when it was
new that bad? Obviously not. As to the supposed impossibility of having various systems
for paying 'insurance claims in different states, were the problems of having differing
versions of the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as the old commercial law, in effect
in different states so overwhelming that we were driven to a federal commercial law?
Obviously not. Even more fundamentally, is Mr. Kemper's belief in the federal system
so unsubstantial that he thinks states cannot experiment with fundamental legal reform
without "irresistably" calling forth federal intervention? If that is so, one of the great
virtues of the federal system-the capacity of individual states to act as laboratories experimenting with reform-has disappeared.
13 For discussion of the Guaranteed Benefits Plan, see King, The Insurance Industry
and Compensation Plans, 43 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 1137, 1152-7 (1968).
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When I gently chided one insurance executive that the Guaranteed
Benefits Plan seemed purposely to build in friction and a complicated
mode of payment in order to stave off government insurance, he replied, no doubt sincerely, that the Guaranteed Benefits Plan retains the
fault criterion, not so much as a complication for complication's sake,
but because of the belief that the public wants to retain the fault
criterion--or at least have the option of doing so after an accident. Such
a reason, assuming it is valid, would make sense. However, several
recent surveys would seem to indicate that the public would prefer
being guaranteed payment by one's own insurance company for outof-pocket loss regardless of fault as opposed to taking the chance of
recovering more if, and only if, a tort claim can be established. A survey
conducted at the University of Illinois showed 71 per cent of those responding preferring such nonfault payment.1 4 A survey conducted by
the American Insurance Association showed about 72 per cent of those
expressing an opinion favoring nonfault insurance. 5 And a poll conducted by the Minneapolis Tribune reversed a finding of an earlier
poll by the same paper which indicated that the public prefers the fault
system. Although the earlier poll showed some 64 per cent of those expressing an opinion opposed to nonfault insurance, 16 the later poll,
which asked the respondents to assume there would be prompter payment and lower insurance premiums under nonfault insurance by
almost 25 per cent, found 67 per cent of those expressing an opinion
7
favoring such nonfault insurance.'
But the important point is that whereas public preference is a
legitimate factor in deciding how automobile insurance ought to be
restructured, if at all, speculation on which mode of insurance is more
or less likely to lead to government takeover seems both far-fetched
and not a very sound basis for structuring automobile insurance reform.
14 The results of the survey are contained in a book by J. O'CONNELL & W. WILSON,
the Fall, 1969 list of the University of Illinois

CAR INSURANCE AND CONSUMER DEsiRm on

Press.
15 Awareness of and Attitude Toward a New Kind of Automobile Insurance, ORC
Caravan Surveys, Inc. (1968). For a report of the survey, see The National Underwriter
(Fire & Casualty), Feb. 14, 1969, at 1,col. 2. It should be noted that the survey conducted
on behalf of the American Insurance Association assumed, unlike the University of
Illinois survey, that "on the average, rates [for the nonfault insurance] would be lower
by 30%." The survey found 56% favoring the new nonfault insurance, 21% preferring
the present system, 21% undecided, 1% preferring something else, and 1% going unreported. These figures mean that 72% of those expressing an opinion favored nonfault
insurance.
16 Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 8, 1968. This poll showed 60% opposed to nonfault
insurance, 34% in favor of it, and 6% undecided. These figures mean that 64% of those
expressing an opinion were opposed to nonfault insurance.
37 Minneapolis Tribune, April 6, 1969. This poll showed 62%
favoring nonfault

insurance, 31% opposed, and 7% with no opinion. These figures mean that 67% of
those expressing an opinion favored nonfault insurance.
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In the first place, there has been simplified nonfault criterion for payment of claims in many forms of insurance for generations without
governmental takeover. Secondly, the reason for government takeover
of any line of insurance seems to be not so much the ease of payment,
but whether private insurance is performing adequately in selling
and servicing the market. For example, Medicare (medical insurance
for the aged under social security) came into being because private
insurance companies were not providing adequate medical insurance
for the aged. Similarly, federal crop insurance and flood insurance came
about because of the inadequacy of privately offered insurance. As an
additional example, federal reinsurance to cover property in the inner
city was an outgrowth of the inadequacy of the private market and
indeed occurred at the invitation of the insurance industry.
Concerning both federal regulation and federal ownership of automobile insurance, Robert Rennie, Vice-President of Nationwide Insurance Company, stated in response to James Kemper's fears:
I must also take issue with Mr. Kemper's comments on the
threat of federal regulation and federal preemption. In my
view, the threat lies not in reform of state systems, but in the
absence of state action. It is when the states fail to follow
clearly identified lines for dealing with a social problem that
the federal government moves in.' 8
As I read Mr. Rennie, he is convinced that federal automobile insurance will not follow from simplifying the insured event but rather
from too strong a commitment to the status quo and all its inadequacies.
That not all the insurance industry equates simplifying the insured
event with an "irresistable" takeover by the federal government is
shown by the recent so-called Complete Protection Plan proposed by
the American Insurance Association, a trade organization of 168 stock
insurance companies who write approximately 38 per cent of all
automobile insurance in the United States. Under this plan, in every
instance and without any option, one's own insurance company would
pay a victim for his out-of-pocket expenses, regardless of fault, and the
tort suit arising from auto accidents would be completely eliminated. 9
Regardless of the ultimate merits of this proposal (about which, as
with the Basic Protection Plan, there is legitimate difference of opin18 Rennie, Remarks, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 474, 477 (1967), in CRIsis 114, 117.
29 AMERICAN INSURANCE AssOCIATION,
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REPARATIONS (1968). For a discussion of the plan, see King, supra note 13, at 1161-4.
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ion), it does serve to illustrate that at least some segments of the
insurance industry can think about streamlining the insured event and
replacing tort insurance with nonfault insurance without thinking
about such a change as "socialism" and without being convinced that
federal writing of insurance will necessarily follow.

